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COMMENTS
Parental Liability for Preconception Negligence:
Do Parents Owe a Legal Duty to Their
Potential Children?
For wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an in-
jury, it also gives a remedy by action; and therefore, wherever a
new injury is done, a new method of remedy must be pursued I
INTRODUCTION
We live in a society where the value of human life is paramount.
It should therefore go unquestioned that a child has the right to be
born with a sound mind and body, "to the fullest extent possible."'2
There has been recognition of an infant's right to recover for inju-
ries caused by another's negligence prior to the infant's birth.3 Judi-
cial recognition of these prebirth torts has created a potential new
cause of action: parental tort liability to a defective child,4 born
alive, for injuries resulting from a parent's negligence prior to
conception.
This Comment will attempt to analyze this potential cause of ac-
tion and its ramifications. First, an overview of the current law re-
lating to prenatal and preconception torts will be discussed. 5
Second, the parental immunity doctrine will be reviewed with em-
phasis being placed on its existence as a possible bar to parental
liability.6 Third, an analysis of a parent's duty to an unconceived
child will be made to determine whether or not potential parents
shall owe a legally cognizable duty to their future child.7 Finally,
specific limitations which may be imposed on such a parental duty
1. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123.
2. Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?'"- An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Pre-
natal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325 (1984).
3. See infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text. This trend includes recognition
of causes of action for postconception as well as preconception negligence.
4. The term "defective child" will be used throughout this Comment. The author
uses this term only to depict an infant born with mental and/or physical abnormalities.
No other connotations of this term are intended.
5. There will be discussion as to the law relating to prenatal injuries. There are
parallels that exist between prenatal injuries and the proposed cause of action. Indeed,
courts have stated that the case law on prenatal injuries is the "best available means" for
predicting how the courts should rule on claims for preconception injuries. See Berg-
streser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978).
6. See infra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 96-168 and accompanying text.
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of care will be discussed.8
I. PRENATAL AND PRECONCEPTION TORTS
A. An Overview of Prenatal Torts
The first case to address the issue of an infant's right to recover
for injuries sustained while in utero9 was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton.10 In Dietrich, Justice Holmes established a precedent
8. See infra notes 169-96 and accompanying text. This Comment will not con-
sider the subject of wrongful death. The focus will be made on the live birth of a defec-
tive child with the assumption that the child survives for a substantial period of time.
It is also necessary to distinguish other types of actions from the one under examina-
tion. A wrongful life action may be brought by either the parent or child, against a
defendant, usually a doctor or hospital. The plaintiff's assertion is that due to the de-
fendant's negligence, the child was allowed to be born. In essence, the plaintiff contends
that because of the defective condition of the child, the child would have been better off
not being born.
The term "wrongful life" originated in the case of Flores ex rel. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41
Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). In Zepeda, a
child unsuccessfully brought suit against his biological father for being born illegitimate.
Id. at 262-63, 190 N.E.2d at 859. There are presently three states that have allowed
wrongful life actions: California, Washington and New Jersey. California was the first
state to permit a wrongful life cause of action. Specifically, in Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.
3d 220, 223-24, 643 P.2d 954, 955-56, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1982), the California
Supreme Court allowed a child's wrongful life action against a physician for failing to
properly diagnose and advise the child's parents of a hereditary hearing defect in the
child's older sibling. However, the court limited the child's recovery to special dam-
ages, disallowing any recovery based on general damages. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The second state to allow a recovery for wrongful life was Wash-
ington. In Harbeson ex rel. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 463, 656
P.2d 483, 487 (1983), two children were born with severe birth defects caused by their
mother's ingestion of the drug Dilantin. The defendant physicians did not advise the
mother of the potential severity of birth defects that could result from ingestion of this
drug during pregnancy. As the California Supreme Court did in Turpin, the Harbeson
court limited the children's recovery to extraordinary expenses required due to their
conditions. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497. The third state to recognize wrongful life was
New Jersey. Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343-44, 478 A.2d 755, 758
(1984). In Procanik, the defendant physicians were negligent in diagnosing the mother's
German measles in the first trimester of her pregnancy. Therefore, she was deprived of
the choice of terminating her pregnancy. Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758. Like the Califor-
nia and Washington courts, New Jersey limited recovery to special damages. Id. at 356,
478 A.2d at 764. See also Note, Child v. Parent: A Viable New Tort of Wrongful Life?,
24 ARIz. L. REv. 391 (1982) (where the author denounces such a cause of action).
A wrongful conception or wrongful birth action is similar. The plaintiff's contention
is that due to the defendant's negligence, the child was conceived. These actions usually
arise when a doctor negligently prescribes an improper contraceptive, or when a sterili-
zation procedure is negligently performed, thus allowing conception to take place. Se?
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (rex. 1975), where the Texas Supreme Court be-
came the first United States court to allow recovery for wrongful birth. The court,
however, limited the parents' damages to pecuniary expenses necessary for the child's
care. See also Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 140, 144 (1976).
9. "In utero" means in the uterus. It refers to the entire normal gestation period.
It is the period of pregnancy; when the child is being carried by the mother. WEBSTER'S
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2525 (3d ed. 1971).
10. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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which denied an infant the right to recover for injuries sustained
while in utero. This holding stood for sixty-two years.1
In Dietrich, a woman who was four to five months pregnant fell
and was injured while walking on a defective highway maintained
by the defendant.' 2 As a result of this fall, she suffered a miscar-
riage. The premature child survived only ten to fifteen minutes.'3
A wrongful death action was asserted on behalf of the deceased
child.'4
In denying the action, Justice Holmes stated that the unborn
child did not have locus standi 5 in court. His theory, which be-
came known as the entity theory, was that the mother and the fetus
were really one, that they could not be separated and, therefore,
that the child could never sue on his own behalf.16 Any injuries
that may have been received by the child were too remote to be
recoverable by the child, but could be recovered by the mother.' 7
Some of the reasoning employed by Justice Holmes may appear
unfounded by someone reading the case today. However, based on
the state of existing medical knowledge at Holmes' disposal when
the opinion was written, the outcome is understandable.' 8 The
gradual demise of the Dietrich holding, however, was to begin
shortly.
In Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital,19 a child was born severely crip-
pled due to the defendant's negligent conduct while caring for the
child's mother during her pregnancy. The child was denied a cause
of action20 based upon the reasoning of the Dietrich decision. How-
l1. See infra notes 12-23 and accompanying text. See also Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 184 111. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (where the court denied recovery on the strength
of the Dietrich decision).
12. 138 Mass. at 14.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 16. Locus standi refers to an individual's right to appear "in a court of
justice, or before a legislative body, on a given question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
848 (5th ed. 1979).
16. Justice Holmes considered the mother and the fetus to be inseparable. He con-
sidered the mother and the fetus to be one legal entity, thus preventing the fetus from
having any legal rights. 138 Mass. at 16.
17. Id. at 17. The Dietrich opinion implies that the only duty owed by the defend-
ants was to the mother and that this duty did not extend to her unborn child.
18. When the Dietrich opinion was written, medical science was not nearly as ad-
vanced as it is today. In Renslow ex rel. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348,
355, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1977), the Illinois Supreme Court noted that, "[a]s medical
science progressed, the courts took notice that a fetus is a separate human entity prior to
birth. . . . Thus, various courts have gradually come to recognize that the embryo,
from the moment of conception, is a separate organism that can be compensated for
negligently inflicted prenatal harm." See also infra note 32 and accompanying text.
19. Allaire, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), overruled in, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill.
422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
20. 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
1986]
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ever, in his well known dissenting opinion, Justice Boggs laid the
foundation for the demise of Justice Holmes' entity theory.21
Justice Boggs argued that viability should be the stage at which a
child should be allowed to maintain an action.22 Justice Boggs ex-
plained that to say that a fetus or unborn child is viable means that
it is sufficiently developed to be able to live outside the mother's
womb, either under normal conditions or, according to authorities,
even in an incubator.23
The viability test was finally accepted by a court in Bonbrest v.
Kotz.24 Specifically, the District Court of the United States for the
District of Columbia said of a fetus:
True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of extra-uterine
life-and while dependent for its continued development on suste-
nance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is
not a "part" of the mother in the sense of a constituent ele-
ment-as that term is generally understood.25
In Bonbrest, the viable infant child was injured when she was re-
moved from her mother's womb through alleged professional mal-
practice by the defendant physicians.26 The Bonbrest court took
note of the fact that a child has rights as an individual, stating that
there is no right more inherent and sacrosanct than an individual's
right to the possession and enjoyment of his life with the full use of
his limbs and body.27 The court went on to observe that "'[i]f a
right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without
any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's
fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and inconven-
ience without any compensation therefor.' "28
Criticism of the viability standard stemmed from its imposition of
an arbitrary time period as the determinative factor.29 Commenta-
tors argued that there was no single point in time when a court
could conclude that an unborn child could survive outside the
21. Id. at 368-74, 56 N.E. at 640-42 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
23. Id. See also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent & Child § 151 (1969).
24. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
25. Id. at 140.
26. Id. at 139.
27. Id. at 142.
28. Id. at 141-42 (quoting the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways v.
Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 345 (1933)).
29. Sylvia ex rel. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222-23 (1966). In
Sylvia, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island summarized the arguments for and against
the viability theory. The court concluded: "In our judgment there is no sound reason
for drawing a line at the precise moment of the fetal development when the child attains
the capability of an independent existence, and we reject viability as a decisive crite-
rion." Id. at 79, 220 A.2d at 223. See also Comment, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries:
The Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 587 (1976).
[Vol. 22
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mother's womb.30 In response to this criticism, a noticeable shift
took place in the law of recognizing the rights of a fetus as a sepa-
rate entity. Courts began to employ a biological approach to deter-
mine when a fetus became a separate entity.31 Under this biological
theory, the fetus is treated as a separate organism from the time of
conception, 32 not at its viable stage.33
The declining judicial attitude towards the viability standard and
the trend towards acceptance of the biological approach are well
founded. Rejection of the viability standard, and acceptance of the
biological theory, should center on issues of public policy. Should
one child be allowed recovery for prenatal injuries, and another de-
nied, merely because he is a little more advanced in fetal life? This
question should be answered in the negative. It is irrelevant
whether or not a child was viable at the time it was injured. The
child will still incur the same harm after birth. Therefore, there is
no sound reason for denying a child, injured while in a previable
state, an opportunity for redress. 34 It is fundamental that justice
dictates the recognition of a cause of action when a fetus, later born
alive, has been negligently injured.35
With this background at our disposal, it is necessary to examine
how courts have considered suits to recover for injuries due to an-
other's negligence prior to conception.
B. An Overview of Preconception Torts36
A case of paramount importance which considered an infant's
right to recover for injuries received due to another's preconception
30. Id.
31. In Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953),
appeal granted, 283 A.D. 914, 129 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1954), the court held that the legal
entity of a child begins with the biological separability of a fetus from its mother. This,
the court said, coincides with conception and, therefore, if born alive, a child may re-
cover for prenatal injuries received due to the tortious conduct of another anytime at or
after conception, regardless of viability. Id. at 544-45, 125 N.Y.S.2d 697-98.
32. See Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 355, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (citing Sinkler ex rel.
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Smith ex rel. Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 366, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960); Bennet ex rel. Bennett v. Hymers,
101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958)). In Renslow, the Supreme Court of
Illinois acknowledged that "[i]t is by now commonly accepted that at conception the
egg and sperm unite to jointly provide the genetic material requisite for human life.
Thus, various courts have gradually come to recognize that the embryo, from the mo-
ment of conception, is a separate organism . Id.
33. See supra note 23.
34. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
35. Note, Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging Tort, 67 GEO. L.J.
1239, 1257 (1979).
36. Preconception torts are those that occur prior to the uniting of the sperm and
egg. The preconception tortious conduct results in injury to the infant during its
prenatal development. Thus, by the time of birth, an injury which has occurred as a
result of an act perpetrated prior to conception has left the child "to suffer its
1986]
5
Carroll: Parental Liability for Preconception Negligence: Do Parents Owe a
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
negligence was Renslow ex rel. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital.37 In
Renslow, the Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with a suit,
dismissed by the trial court, against a doctor and a hospital for pre-
conception negligence brought by a mother on behalf of her minor
daughter.38 The complaint alleged that, at age thirteen, the plain-
tiff's mother was negligently transfused twice with Rh-positive
blood by the defendants. 39 This transfusion was not compatible
with the mother, thus causing a sensitization of the mother's Rh
negative blood.40 It was alleged that this sensitization of the
mother's blood caused prenatal damage to the plaintiff's hemolitic
processes, thus inducing a premature birth. Plaintiff further alleged
that, as a result of the defendants' preconception negligence, she
suffered permanent damage to various organs, her brain and her
nervous system.41
In allowing a cause of action for preconception negligence, the
court in Renslow recognized the impropriety of disallowing an in-
fant's claim merely because she was not yet in existence at the time
of the tortious conduct. Because an infant could recover for prena-
tal injuries induced while in a previable stage,42 the court acknowl-
edged that a defendant could be liable to one "whose existence was
consequences throughout the remainder of his life." Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A
New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REv. 706, 707 (1977).
37. 67 I11. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). The first case to address the issue of a
preconception negligence claim was Morgan ex rel. Morgan v. United States, 143 F.
Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1956). In Morgan, the parents of an infant afflicted with birth de-
fects brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The parents alleged that the negligent blood transfusion given to the mother, a patient
at an Army hospital about one year before the child's conception, caused the child's
birth defects. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that Pennsylvania
had not yet recognized a prenatal cause of action. Id. at 584.
The first case in which a preconception negligence cause of action was recognized was
Jorgensen ex rel. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th
Cir. 1973). In Jorgensen, the father asserted claims as administrator for the estate of
one of his twin daughters, who died at the age of three and one-half years, and as next
friend of the surviving twin daughter. He alleged that the twins' afflictions with Down's
syndrome were caused by chromosomal abnormalities in their mother, which were al-
leged to have resulted from their mother's use of the defendant's oral contraceptives.
483 F.2d at 238. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that only the legislature should create rights pertaining to preconception
claims. Jorgensen, 336 F. Supp. 961, 962-63 (W.D. Okla. 1972). The Tenth Circuit
determined that because the Oklahoma courts would have handled the plaintiff's claim
of injuries as one of causation, to be determined by competent medical proof, the district
court was incorrect in concluding that such a cause of action must await legislative
action. 483 F.2d at 240.
38. 67 Ill. 2d at 348-49, 367 N.E.2d at 1250-51.
39. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 350, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
42. This author is assuming that the infant is in a jurisdiction which has rejected
the viability standard. See supra notes 23 and 32.
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not apparent at the time of [the defendants'] act." 43 This recogni-
tion of a cause of action for prenatal injuries, sustained as a result of
negligent acts occurring prior to the infant's conception, is a "logi-
cal extension of the development in prenatal injury law." 44
The Renslow court applied basic tort principles in adopting this
cause of action. Operating under the theory that the purpose of tort
law is to redress a wrong, Justice Dooley stated in his concurring
opinion:
"*** It is axiomatic that every person owes a duty to all per-
sons to exercise ordinary care to guard against any injury which
may naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable con-
sequence of his act, and the law is presumed to furnish a remedy
for the redress of every wrong. This duty to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury to another does not depend upon contract,
privity of interest or the proximity of relationship between the
parties. It extends to remote and unknown persons." '45
Thus, the court in Renslow did not hold that the existence of the
plaintiff at the time of the tortious conduct was necessary to a find-
ing of a duty.46 However, as set forth above, the injury had to be a
reasonably probable and foreseeable result, in order for a duty to
arise.47
The same reasoning was employed by the court in Park v. Ches-
sin.48 Park was a wrongful life action49 by a mother and father, on
behalf of their infant child, against an obstetrician for erroneously
advising the mother that she could have another child without fear
of its being born with the fatal hereditary disease known as polycys-
tic kidney disease.50 The newborn child only survived for two and
one-half years.51 The Park court affirmed the lower court's denial
of a motion to dismiss the wrongful life cause of action asserted on
43. 67 Ill. 2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
44. Note, Preconception Tort-The Need for a Limitation, 44 Mo. L. REV. 143, 145
(1979).
45. 67 Ill. 2d at 364-65, 367 N.E.2d at 1258 (Dooley, J., concurring) (quoting Win-
tersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 103, 197 N.E. 578, 582
(1935) (citations ommitted)). For a more extensive discussion of the duty concept, see
infra notes 96-150 and accompanying text.
46. 67 Ill. 2d at 357-60, 367 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
47. Id. at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
48. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), rev'd, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
49. See supra note 8 for a discussion of wrongful life actions.
50. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111. The plaintiff, six years earlier, had
given birth to a child with this disease. The child lived five hours before dying. Plain-
tiffs contended that the defendants "gave them the medically inaccurate advice that the
chances of having any future baby with polyeystic kidney disease were 'practically nil'
inasmuch as the disease was not hereditary." Id. Polycystic kidney disease is a fatal
hereditary disease with a substantial probability of recurrence. Id.
51. Id.
19861
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behalf of the child.52 The court aptly reasoned that by allowing this
wrongful life action it was not acting outside of the scope of existing
tort principles.5 3 The court based its holding on the fact that the
plaintiffs had affirmatively sought a specific medical opinion of the
defendants with regard to having another child with the specific
polycystic kidney disease, and that the obstetrician's negligence was
directly responsible for the physical injury of another. Thus, the
court held that compensation to the injured party for all physical
and mental suffering was due.5 4
In summation, the case law shows a clear trend toward allowing
a cause of action on behalf of an infant for injuries received due to
the negligence of another, either during the prenatal stage or prior
to conception. As to prenatal claims, the trend is to afford the child
legal rights to bring such an action from the moment of concep-
tion.55 In allowing claims for preconception torts, modem courts
do not bar the child from bringing suit merely because he or she
was not yet in existence at the time of the negligent conduct.5 6 The
child's injury must have been a reasonably probable and foreseeable
result of the negligent conduct.57
The question then arises as to whether the child's parent or par-
ents can be made to answer for such a cause of action.
II. THE PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. The Foundation
The parental immunity doctrine may be a defense to an infant's
claim58 against its parents for a preconception tort. The doctrine
stands for the general proposition that an unemancipated minor
may not maintain an action in tort against his or her parents.59
This judicially created doctrine has been in existence for nearly one
hundred years. 60 In fact, for a number of years, the doctrine was a
52. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
53. Id. at 86-87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14.
54. Id. at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
55. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. Throughout this discussion of an infant's right to bring an action against his or
her parents, it must be remembered that, generally, an infant cannot personally bring an
action on his or her own behalf. The infant must be represented by a legally authorized
individual, such as a guardian or next friend. See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants
§ 155 (1969).
59. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent & Child § 151 (1969). This doctrine of immunity is
based on the public policy of "protecting family unity, domestic serenity, and parental
discipline." Id.
60. As will be noted, the doctrine was first announced in 1891. It has lasted to
date. However, as will be discussed, it has been severely modified, if not totally abro-
[Vol. 2.2
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complete bar to a child's suit against his or her parent. 61 The doc-
trine's roots are in three cases, known as the "Great Trilogy," de-
cided around the turn of the century. 62
The first of these three cases, Hewlett v. George,63 was decided in
1891. In Hewlett, the minor daughter brought a civil suit against
her mother for wrongfully confiming her in an insane asylum. 64 It
was not clear from the evidence presented whether or not the
daughter was living in her mother's house when the suit com-
menced. 65 However, the daughter, who had subsequently married,
was living apart from her husband at the time.66 The court rea-
soned that if the plaintiff was married, the parent-child relationship
may have been dissolved, thus possibly allowing the plaintiff to suc-
cessfully maintain an action against the parent. 67
The Hewlett court emphasized the traditional obligations of par-
ents and their children. It found that certain reciprocal duties ex-
isted between a parent and child. Duties, such as a parent's duty to
"care for" and "guide" the child, and a child's duty to "aid" and
"obey" the parent, prevent the maintenance of such an action.68
The court then concluded that on the basis of family harmony
and public policy, a child could not maintain a civil suit against its
parent.69 The court held that:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.70
The court continued by acknowledging that the state's criminal
law gave a minor protection from parental violence and other abu-
sive activities. 71 It is, therefore, evident that the Hewlett court's in-
tention was to restrain the legal rights of minors so as to maintain a
stable, family-oriented society.72
gated. For an excellent detailed examination of the parental immunity doctrine, see
Beal, supra note 2, at 325, 335-37.
61. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
62. Id.; see also infra notes 63, 73 and 79.
63. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
64. Id. at 704, 9 So. at 886.
65. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court's reasoning was that by marrying, the relationship of parent and
child would dissolve, at least insofar as that "relationship imposed the duty upon the
parent to protect and care for and control, and the child to aid and comfort and obey."
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
19861
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The two cases that followed Hewlett expanded the Hewlett court's
ruling. In McKelvey v. McKelvey, 73 the Supreme Court of Tennes-
see denied a minor child's suit against her parents for cruel and
inhuman treatment.74 As in Hewlett, the McKelvey court gave
much attention to policy justifications and the importance of family
harmony in denying the child's action.75
The McKelvey court, in asserting its position, expanded the Hew-
lett court's ruling. It analogized the child-parent relationship with
that of a husband and wife.76 The court asserted that the unity of
the husband and wife, by virtue of the marriage relationship, pre-
vented intramarital civil suits.77 However, the court noted that
once the relationship was ended by divorce, the former husband and
wife could sue each other.78 This reasoning suggests that the Ten-
nessee courts would have allowed a suit by a child against its par-
ents if the family relationship had already been ended.
The final case of the trilogy is an example of the inequitable con-
sequences that were often reached by adherence to the parental im-
munity doctrine. In Roller ex reL Million v. Roller,7 9 the Supreme
Court of Washington held that a fifteen-year-old girl did not have a
cause of action for civil damages against her father as a result of his
conviction for raping her.80 In denying the minor child's claim on
public policy grounds, the court reviewed the Hewlett decision.8'
Additionally, the Roller court noted two other justifications for the
parental immunity doctrine. The first was the court's apprehension
that if it allowed a minor to recover from its parents then, in the
event of the child's death, the parents, as the child's heirs, might
receive the judgment back.82 The second reason expressed by the
Roller court involved the public interest in the financial welfare of
the other minor members of the family.83 Specfically, the court
feared that by allowing one minor child to recover from its parents,
other minor children of the family might be cheated out of their
potential shares of the parents' estate.84
For a number of years following these three cases, the courts de-
73. 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
74. Id. at 389, 77 S.W. at 664.
75. Id. at 391, 77 S.W. at 664-65.
76. Id. at 391, 77 S.W. at 665.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 392, S.W. at 665.
79. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
80. Id. at 243-47, 79 P. at 788-89. In Roller, the defendant father had been con-
victed and sentenced for committing the rape of his minor daughter prior to her institut-
ing the civil action. Id. at 243, 79 P. at 788-89.
81. Id. at 246, 79 P. at 789.
82. Id. at 244-45, 79 P. at 789.
83. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
84. Id.
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nied a minor's right to recover from its parents, at least in civil
court. The courts were adamant in their refusal to risk the disrup-
tion of the social fabric of the family. As will be discussed, how-
ever, when viewed retrospectively, this focus of the early courts may
have been naive.
B. Abrogation of the Doctrine
The justifications set forth for preventing an infant's recovery are
anachronistic today.8 5 The needs of society and the structure of the
family are changing and evolving. Society has become increasingly
complex. The advancements made in such fields as science, trans-
portation and communications have required a reexamination of
our basic notions of justice.8 6
There has been growing recognition within the law, of the inequi-
ties of parental immunity. Much of this judicial distaste has arisen
because the doctrine can be employed as an umbrella rule that pre-
vents recovery to an entire class on the sole ground that they are
minors, and any suit by them against their parents would dissolve
family harmony.87 Modem courts have questioned the early ration-
ale that preservation of family harmony and domestic relations re-
quires that a child be denied recovery for injuries caused by a
parent.88 As one court has stated, "[w]hen the wrong has been
committed, the harm to the basic fabric of the family has already
been done and the source of rancor and discord already introduced
into family relations."8 9
85. For a contrary view, see Thomas ex rel. Inmon v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594
S.W.2d 853 (1980), where the Supreme Court of Arkansas, after expressing its strong
belief in the "sanctity" of the family unit, said that the parental immunity doctrine is
not "a legal anachronism." The court went on to say: "But it is deemed better public
policy that occasional injuries of this kind go unrequited rather than encourage or toler-
ate proceedings so repugnant to natural sentiments concerning family relations." Id. at
223, 594 S.W.2d at 854 (quoting Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 836, 114 S.W.2d 468,
470 (1938)). Inmon concerned the denial of a two and one-half year old child's suit
against grandparents standing in loco parentis, for injuries due to their negligence. Id. at
223, 594 S.W.2d at 854.
86. The courts of the earlier cases, which laid the groundwork for the parental
immunity doctrine, could not have foreseen the advancements society has made. The
role of the automobile in family life could not have been contemplated. Also, the medi-
cal advancements made with regard to health care could not have been foreseen by
these courts at the end of the nineteenth century.
87. Nocktonick ex reL Matson v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 766-67, 611 P.2d 135,
140-41 (1980) (court allowed infant's recovery of damages in an action brought against
a parent for injuries received from the mother's negligence in operation of a motor
vehicle). This discussion of parental immunity deals only with the right of unemanci-
pated children to bring suit against their parents.
88. Id. at 766, 611 P.2d at 140; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 360, 339
N.E.2d 907, 913 (1975).
89. Sorensen, 369 Mass. at 360, 339 N.E.2d at 913 (minor child allowed to recover
against father for injuries received in car accident due to father's negligence).
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One noted jurist has stated that, "[t]o tell [the crippled child and
the parents] that the pains must be endured for the peace and wel-
fare of the family is something of a mockery." 90 Indeed, the court
in Sorensen v. Sorensen was correct when it said:
[A]brogation of the parental immunity doctrine [i]s the proper
approach in light of modem conditions and conceptions of public
policy. Children enjoy the same right to protection and to legal
redress for wrongs done them as others enjoy. Only the strongest
reasons, grounded in public policy, can justify limitation or aboli-
tion of those rights.91
The majority of states have rejected the doctrine as a complete
bar to a minor child's cause of action.92 It does not appear, then, in
light of this judicial attitude toward abrogation of the parental im-
munity doctrine, 93 that a child would be denied the right to seek a
tort remedy against his or her parents for their preconception negli-
gence. The domestic tranquility and family harmony so avidly ar-
gued for in earlier cases, 94 could very possibly have already been
disrupted by the birth of a defective child. To deny such a defective
child the right to bring an action against his or her parents would
clearly deny the child its legal rights. Denying a child such an ac-
tion would be allowing an injury to take place without redress. This
90. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 482, 174 N.E.2d 718, 724, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35, 43 (1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
91. Sorensen, 369 Mass. at 359, 339 N.E.2d at 912.
92. For a detailed analysis of the current status of the parental immunity doctrine
as applied to each state jurisdiction, see Beal, supra note 2, at 335-37.
There are presently nine states which uphold the doctrine as a complete bar to child-
parent actions for negligence. They are: Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9,
177 So. 133 (1937); Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980); Vaughan ex rel.
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974); Bondurant v.
Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Hewlett, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891);
Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Matarese v. Mata-
rese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Campbell v. Grottemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 432
S.W.2d 894 (1968); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
The first state to abolish total immunity was Wisconsin in Goller ex rel. Holden v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). However, the Goller approach main-
tains parental immunity in two areas. The first is where the alleged negligent activity
involves a parent exercising authority over his/her child. 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122
N.W.2d at 198. The second area is where the alleged negligent activity involves a par-
ent exercising his or her own discretion in providing food, housing, shelter and other
health care services. Id.
The California Supreme Court has taken an altogether different approach in deciding
the worthiness of the parental immunity doctrine. In Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971), the court adopted a reasonable parent standard.
The court enunciated its new standard by asking "what would an ordinarily reasonable
and prudentparent have done in similar circumstances?" 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at
653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. This approach addresses the apparent dichotomy presented
by the parental immunity doctrine: recognition of the inherent sanctity of the parent-
child relationship and of the often inequitable consequences of the application of the
parental immunity doctrine.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 63-84.
[Vol. 22
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 22 [1985], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss2/5
1986] PRECONCEPTION NEGLIGENCE
is not the function of the law.95
Parental immunity, however, is only one possible barrier to a
child's action against its parent for a preconception tort. There are
other obstacles which must be overcome before such an action will
be recognized, particularly, judicial recognition of a parental duty
of care to a potential child.
III. PARENTAL DUTY TO A POTENTIAL CHILD
A. In General
If courts are to recognize an infant's cause of action against its
parents for preconception negligence, then it must be established
that the potential parents owe a duty to their prospective children. 96
95. See supra note 1.
96. The primary focus of this Comment is the recognition of the existence of a
parental duty of care to potential offspring and an analysis of how such a duty may be
breached. However, elementary to establishing a negligence cause of action such as the
one being proposed, is proving not only a duty and breach, but also causation and dam-
ages. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAV OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65
(5th ed. 1984).
In proving causation one must show both causation in fact and proximate or legal
cause. Cause in fact is essentially a factual determination of whether the plaintiff's inju-
ries were actually caused by the defendant. Id. at 264-65. Whereas legal, or proximate
cause, is basically a question of legal policy: "whether the policy of the law will extend
the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred." Id.
at 273. It is, therefore, arguable that questions of legal cause may be answered the same
as would be questions of duty. Id.; see also supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
No matter what approach is taken, the plaintiff must prove some causal relationship
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries.
Thus, it is clear that problems of proof with regard to injuries caused by preconcep-
tion activity may exist. Actions for such injuries may be effectively prevented until
medical advances are made. Where lack of medical and scientific proof would result in
conjecture and speculation, a court must dismiss the cause of action. However, "the
mere difficulty of proving a fact is not a very good reason for blocking all attempts to
prove it." Smith ex rel. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
Difficulties in proving an element of recovery should not result in a court's arbitrarily
denying a cause of action. "Recognition of a cause of action now would provide future
claimants with the opportunity to present additional techniques and theories that may
be acceptable to a court." Comment, Preconception Torts: A Look at Our Newest Class
of Litigants, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 97, 118 (1978). See also, Note The Impact of
Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PENN. L. Rnv. 554
(1962).
The final element of a cause of action for negligence is damages. W. KEETON, supra,
at 164-65. Clearly the mental and/or physical injuries suffered by a defective child
constitute damages. The courts may have difficulty in assessing the damages and how
the injured parties should be compensated. See supra note 8 for a discussion regarding
how courts ruling on wrongful life claims have dealt with this problem. The difficulty
in determining compensable damages should not deter courts from recognizing the
cause of action asserted here. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of
the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamen-
tal principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
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In other words, potential parents will be required to conform to a
certain standard of conduct.
It is accepted that all members of society owe a duty to use care
with regard to their conduct, and that this "care" is owed to anyone
who might be foreseeably injured by the individual's negligent con-
duct.97 This duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to an-
other has been extended to include remote and unknown
individuals as well. 98
In general, courts will find a duty where a reasonable person
would acknowledge it and agree that it exists.99 Duty is not a
"static concept;" nor is it sacrosanct. 1°° Duty is an expression of all
policy considerations that cause the law to assert that a certain
plaintiff is entitled to protection.10 1 In California, for example, it is
fundamental that "[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result
of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property
or person." 10 2
Further, the California Supreme Court has held that:
A departure from this fundamental principle involves the bal-
ancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of prevent-
ing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach .... 103
In analyzing the concept of duty, Justice Tobriner perceptively
remarked that the imposition of a duty on an individual is essen-
tially a "conclusory expression that, in cases of a particular type,
liability should be imposed for the damage done." 1 4 Recognition
97. Fleming, The Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 778, 800
(1953); see also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968) (en bane).
98. Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 197 N.E.
578 (1935). This author asserts that potential children, those who have not yet even
been conceived, fall under the classification of remote and unknown.
99. W. KEETON, supra note 96, § 53, at 359.
100. Renslow, 67 Ill. 2d at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
101. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. Rv. 1, 15 (1953); White, The Right of Recovery for
Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REV. 383, 401 (1952)).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
103. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100.
Application of these considerations will be discussed infra notes 109-50 and accompany-
ing text.
104. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) (en bane).
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of a duty owed by prospective parents to their potential children is
essential if courts are to recognize a child's cause of action for pa-
rental preconception negligence.
B. Recognizing a Duty
When an infant child brings an action against a parent for pre-
conception negligence, a court should not arbitrarily deny the ac-
tion. Instead, a court should adjudicate the case by resorting to
factors of public policy and common law notions of duty.10 5 As was
previously stated, 106 there are a number of factors to be considered
when determining whether or not a duty of care is owed to one not
yet in existence.107 Some of these factors have been accepted by the
California courts in delineating a legal duty.10 8 The most important
of these factors are foreseeability, the burden to be incurred, and
public policy considerations. Each of these factors will be discussed
separately.
L Foreseeability.-Foreseeability is an essential prerequiste to
acknowledgment of a legal duty by a court. Foreseeability entails
that which a reasonably prudent person would take into considera-
tion in "guiding practical conduct." 10 9 The foreseeable conse-
quences that must be considered in the context of parental conduct
are injuries to their future child. One illustration of the foreseeabil-
ity of harm is in the field of preconception genetic counseling.
Genetic counseling is a health care device available to society.
Science now possesses the technology to identify individuals who
carry abnormal genes and chromosomes, and risk conceiving a
child with a genetic disease.110 With time, the ability to identify ad-
ditional conditions and diseases will expand. 11 Preconceptional ge-
netic counseling is usually desired by individuals who know that a
certain condition has existed in their family previously and are
afraid of such a condition recurring.1 2 The advances made in the
field of genetics allow prospective parents to make well informed
105. See Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, and supra note 97
and accompanying text. See also Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App.
3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Comment, supra note 96, at 119; and, infra note 144
and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
107. What is being asserted is really a "contingent prospective" duty owed to a po-
tential child by its parents. This term was coined by Justice Holmes in Dietrich, 138
Mass. at 16.
108. 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
109. Fleming, supra note 97, at 782.
110. Green, Genetic Technology: Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48 IND.
L.J. 559, 560 (1973).
111. Id.
112. Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 UTAH L. Rnv. 487 (1971).
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decisions about their childbearing plans.1 13 The risks of having ge-
netically defective children are communicated to the potential par-
ents by the medical experts.114
A geneticist first establishes a diagnosis of the patient. The con-
dition will then be explained to the patient in terms of the potential
risk it poses to them and the potential child. 115 In essence, a geneti-
cist informs potential parents whether they have a genetic abnor-
mality and whether they are carriers who risk conceiving a child
with the genetic abnormality. Foreseeability of injury to the child is
at its maximum when a potential parent has this knowledge given
by the genetic counselor. This knowledge makes the potential par-
ent extremely aware of the gravity of the potential injury. This
knowledge of the parent should be considered by a court in deter-
mining whether or not to recognize a parent's legal duty toward
their potential child.
2. Extent of the Burden.-Another important factor to be con-
sidered by the courts in recognizing a duty of care of potential par-
ents is the extent of the burden that would be placed upon them. 16
Should a couple who plan on conceiving a child act, with regard to
their bodies, without any reasonable restrictions? Such a couple
should not treat their bodies with impunity. Medical advice on the
possible effect of the parents' present activities on a future child
should be sought. Regular health care of a potential mother prior
to conception is beneficial to the potential mother and thus to her
potential child.117 By engaging in such a program of health, a phy-
sician can detect acquired diseases and other abnormalities prior to
conception. Thus, measures can be taken to "eradicate them or, at
least, to minimize their deleterious effects." 11 8
113. Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1493 (1978).
114. Kushnick, When to Refer to a Geneticist, 235 A.M.A. J. 623, 624 (1976). Ad-
vice given to a patient by a geneticist revolves around the "odds and stakes" involved in
reproduction. Robinson, supra note 112, at 488. Precise figures are not always avail-
able; therefore, parents must be satisfied with approximate orders of risk. Nitowsky,
Genetic Counseling: Objectives, Principles and Procedures, 19 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 919, 931 (1976).
Recurrence risks generally fall into the following three classifications:
(1) those in which the recurrence risk may be only slightly higher than the
random risk for all births in the population; (2) those in which there is a high
risk, of the order of 1/10 or greater; and (3) those in which there is a moderate
risk of recurrence on the order of less than 1/10 and usually less than 1/20.
Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 103.
117. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 304 (16th ed.
1980).
118. Id.
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The burdens placed on a woman to prevent possible injury to her
potential child may require her to restrict her occupational and per-
sonal lifestyle prior to conception.119 As one commentator has said:
The public policy debate will be between the protection of the
fetus during the period it is most susceptible to injury and the
willingness of the state to impose a standard of conduct on a
woman during what could be a substantial period of time when
she is in fact not pregnant.' 20
Women with a "chronic" and "severe" drinking problem may be
burdened with controlling these problems before conceiving a child.
Medical professionals discourage such women from conceiving a
child.121 Women who take drugs may be required to stop their drug
intake prior to conceiving a child,122 at least to the extent recom-
mended by a physician.
A man or woman's social life may even be burdened to the extent
of minimizing their sexual activity where one or both of them have
a sexual disease. The effects of a disease, sexually transmitted, can
include injury to the fetus. 123 Contracting syphillis prior to concep-
tion could possibly result in developmental problems for the fe-
tus.1 24 A mother who has herpes and conceives may transmit
problems to a developing fetus.' 25 Sexual intercourse should thus
be either discontinued, at least until the condition is brought under
control, or exercised with extraordinary care, taking all possible
precautions against allowing conception. 126 Since the gravity of the
harm to the potential child is so extreme, the burden of sexual re-
straint would appear justified.
The burden on prospective parents to seek professional assist-
119. Beal, supra note 2, at 362.
120. Id. at 368.
121. Many children born with the defects of "fetal alcohol syndrome" had parents
who were heavy drinkers in the past, but stopped drinking while members of Alcoholics
Anonymous for one and one-half years. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome has been described as:
[A] common pattern of craniofacial, limb, and cardiovascular defects associ-
ated with prenatal and postnatal growth retardation in the offspring of alco-
holic mothers. All the children subsequently demonstrated impaired fine and
gross motor function. The perinatal mortality rate was 17 percent. At seven
years of age, 44 percent of the survivors had an IQ below 80, compared to 9
percent in a control group.
J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 117, at 320-21.
122. Id. at 321.
123. Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Un-
born: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries, and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1401, 1439 (1978).
124. R. BENSON, HANDBOOK OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 516-17 (7th ed.
1980).
125. Id. at 529-30.
126. See Comment, "You Wouldn't Give Me Anything, Would You?" Tort Liability
for Genital Herpes, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 60 (1983) (discussing tort liability of a sex part-
ner for transmitting herpes to the other partner, without the partner's knowledge).
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ance, or to restrict their lives in specified ways, would appear to be
slight when measured against the potential gravity of harm inflicted
on a child.127 It is a reasonable burden which courts should con-
sider in the recognition and imposition of a parental duty of care to
their prospective children.
3. Public Policy Considerations.-In addition to foreseeability
and the extent of the burden imposed, public policy considerations
are of major importance when recognizing a legal duty. 128 The first
policy consideration is the potential for defective children to be-
come wards of the state.129 It is not disputed that society has a
direct interest in providing mentally and physically handicapped
citizens with the assistance necessary to their welfare. However, it is
asserted here that society also has a direct interest in limiting, when
possible, the injuries suffered by its citizens. Recognition of a duty
on potential parents would serve such a purpose.
A second policy consideration is, that by holding parents liable
for their negligent conduct prior to conception, a proper allocation
of fault as between tortfeasors would result. If parents cannot be
held liable for their acts, then judgments may be sought against
other parties, particularly physicians and hospitals. If a plaintiff
knows that he or she will not be allowed a cause of action against
his or her parents, and the parents as well as the physicians were
negligent, then excessive judgments may be sought against the phy-
sicians and/or hospital. Holding parents to a duty of care would be
an equitable solution to this possibility.'30
127. W. KEETON, supra note 96, at 171.
128. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
129. See Robinson, supra note 112, at 489. An argument may be made that since
parents will be supporting the defective child until he or she reaches majority age, there
is no reason that the child should receive more compensation from the parents. To
answer this argument, one should consider what happens after the child reaches major-
ity age. If the parents stop supporting the child, the state will have to undertake the
support. A judgment against the parents could be used to offset this. Moreover, this
money judgment could be put into a trust fund for the child's benefit. A substantial
amount of income could be derived from such a fund, which could provide for much of
the child's support after he or she reached majority age. And what if the parents simply
refuse to support their defective child? A judgment against the parents would protect
the child and the state from such a situation. As one author has stated in discussing
compensation for genetically deficient children:
Although a monetary judgment for pain and suffering cannot make them
"whole," any more than it actually does for most injured persons, it may pro-
vide some balm for the inner wounds of congenitally defective children if it is
spent so as to bring some compensating joy, and the feeling of being "special"
in a good sense, into their lives.
Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. Rnv. 618, 655 (1979).
130. This does not mean to say that other tortfeasors should or would be exonerated
from liability. They would still be liable for their tortious conduct to whatever extent it
existed.
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A final policy consideration in recognizing such a parental duty
would be that of deterrence. Imposition of a duty of care on poten-
tial parents prior to conception would have the effect of decreasing
the number of genetically deformed children born into society. Par-
ents would be much more conscientious about their health care
plans and the possibility of conceiving genetically diseased children.
Such a deterrent effect could result in a decrease in the burden
placed on society for maintenance of special institutions.13 1 There
are statutes enacted in some states aimed at effectuating this policy
of deterrence, 132 as well as preventing the spread of communicable
diseases. 133 In California, for example, the state legislature has es-
tablished the requirement of a premarital examination before a mar-
riage license will be granted.134 If one of the applicants has syphillis
or another type of communicable infection, the marriage license will
not be issued.135 A further attempt by the legislature to deter the
spread of sexual diseases was demonstrated by the enactment of sec-
tion 3198 of the California Health and Safety Code. 136 Specifically,
section 3198 provides that "[a]ny person who. . . exposes any per-
son to or infects any person with any venereal disease; or any person
infected with a venereal disease in an infectious state who knows of
such condition and who marries or has sexual intercourse, is guilty
of a misdemeanor."1 37 Statutes such as this depict a definite recog-
nition of social dilemmas and the need to control these problems.
C. Parental Knowledge and Recognition of a Duty of Care
One final argument for the recognition and imposition of a duty
of care on prospective parents must be asserted here. When a par-
ent or an infant brings an action against a medical professional for
131. Most of the children born with serious genetic defects end up in special institu-
tions with the financial cost to society estimated at several billion dollars per year. See
Robinson, supra note 112, at 489.
132. For example, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 309 (West Supp. 1986),
where the legislature has stated: "It is the policy of the State of California to make
every effort to detect, as early as possible,. . . preventable heritable disorders leading to
mental retardation or physical defects." Id. This statute continues by authorizing the
State Department of Health Services to establish a genetic disease unit to promote a
statewide program of testing information and counseling services. Id.
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4300 (West 1983).
134. Id. See also 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAWV Husband & Wife
§ 22 (Supp. 1984).
135. Id. In addition, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4300(b) (West 1983) requires that female
applicants furnish proof of immunization from German measles, unless they have been
surgically sterilized or are over 50 years of age. Id.
136. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3198 (West 1979).
137. Id. Thus, the language of this statute would appear to create a legal duty, on
individuals with knowledge that they have a venereal disease, not to have intercourse.
This legislative intent can possibly be expanded to cover an infected individual's duty
not to have intercourse and conceive a child.
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injuries to a defective child due to the physician's negligence prior
to conception,1 38 it must be shown that the doctor's act of failing to
inform the parents of a risk was the proximate cause of the injuries.
In other words, it must be demonstrated that the "injury was a fore-
seeable risk 'of the treatment given' and that a reasonable person
properly informed of the medical dangers associated with the avail-
able procedures and with nontreatment, would not have submitted
to the procedure."1 39
Logic would seem to support the proposition that when a doctor
informs parents of highly possible risks, and the parents do not fol-
low the physician's recommendations, resulting in a child being
born with severe defects, the child's defective condition was a fore-
seeable risk of not accepting the doctor's recommendations. There-
fore, the parents' failure to accept the doctor's advice is the
proximate cause of the defective child's condition.
Further, society puts a heavy burden on medical professionals to
adequately inform their patients of potential risks. 4  Accordingly,
these professionals are held to a very high standard of care.141 It is
reasonable to expect individuals to adhere to a medical profes-
sional's recommendations. 142 For, just as a doctor may be legally
liable for giving incorrect advice,1 43 individuals should not be al..
lowed to ignore this advice and injure another person. In a fairly
recent California case, the court made reference to this issue in the
context of a parent receiving adequate knowledge of potential risks
from a physician.
In Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,144 the
court held that a minor child stated a cause of action against a med-
ical testing laboratory for personal injuries due to the laboratory's
138. See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Renslow, 67 III. 2d
348, 367 N.E.2d 1250; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
139. Note, supra note 113, at 1509.
140. W. KEFTON, supra note 96, at 190.
141. Id. at 185. Professor Keeton has stated that:
[I]f a person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even intelligence superior to
that of the ordinary person, the law will demand of that person conduct con-
sistent with it. . . .Professional persons. .. are required not only to exercise
reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of
special knowledge and ability.
Id.
142. For a contrary view, see Capron, supra note 129, at 661, where the author
states that:
To hold parents liable for a. .. "breach" [comparable to that of a doctor's
breach] would depend upon concluding either that, independent of genetic
counseling, they are already under a special duty of care toward their children,
or that such a special duty ought to be created for matters of genetics.
143. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
144. Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), modified in, Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954.
182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (en banc) (damages allowable as special damages only).
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PRECONCEPTION NEGLIGENCE
failure to detect Tay-Sachs disease in her parents. 145 The child's
parents had retained the defendant laboratories to perform specific
tests on them to determine whether either of them were carriers of
genes which would result in the conception of a child afflicted with
Tay-Sachs. 146 Of interest here is dictum stated in the court's opin-
ion in Curlender. In discussing the non-liability of the medical pro-
fession when parents proceed with a pregnancy despite adequate
warnings by the physicians, the court said, "[U]nder such circum-
stances, we see no sound public policy which should protect those
parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering and misery
which they have wrought upon their offspring." 147
These statements seem to depict a judicial attitude in California
toward recognizing an infant's right to be born into the world
whole, and the parents' duty to heed medical advice. The
Curlender decision implies that this right should not be denied an
infant merely because it is his or her parents whose actions caused
the injury, even if these actions occurred prior to the infant's
conception.
It is, therefore, arguable that in California a parent may owe a
duty to an unconceived child to avoid negligent conduct resulting in
injury to the child. Such a duty would conform to the traditional
concepts of tort law. 148 Public policy considerations 49 and emerg-
ing scientific fields150 lend further support for the creation and rec-
ognition of such a parental duty to the unborn child. This new duty
would require parents to conform to the standard of care of reason-
ably prudent prospective parents.
D. Application of this Duty of Care
When determining whether or not parents have conformed to the
145. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. Curlender was a wrongful life
action against the testing laboratory and a physician. The court reasoned that, "a rever-
ent appreciation of life compels recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she may be,
has come into existence as a living person with certain rights." Id. at 829, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 488.
146. Id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
147. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. However, in an apparent response to the
dictum of the Curlender court, the California Legislature enacted section 43.6 of the
Civil Code. It states in pertinent part:
(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim
that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have
been allowed to have been born alive.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (Deering 1981).
The cause of action being discussed in this Comment is not a wrongful life action, but
rather a negligence cause of action. It remains to be seen what effect section 43.6 would
have on this type of action.
148. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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proper standard of care, the reasonableness of their conduct is a
factor in the analysis. Conduct is unreasonable where a foreseeable
danger is involved, 51 and the defendant acts or does not act, know-
ing danger may possibly result.152 It must be determined whether
the defendant's acts or omissions were unreasonable. The allegedly
negligent conduct must be examined "in the light of the possibilities
apparent to him at the time." 153 "As the gravity of the possible
harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be
correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution." 154 When a
parent undertakes affirmative conduct, he or she also undertakes a
duty to take reasonable precautions to protect others from injury, 55
in this context a potential child. A negative duty thus arises to re-
frain from unreasonably dangerous conduct.15 6
Examination of a few hypothetical scenarios will illustrate how
this parental duty of care may be breached. Consider a situation
where a child is born severely deformed due to abnormal chromo-
somal changes arising from the mother's preconception drug
abuse.157 Could the mother or father or both be said to have been
negligent in allowing conception? Assuming one of them or both
were aware of their own drug abuse, can they be said to have acted
reasonably if they did not seek medical advice on the possible effects
of their prior drug abuse? If such a couple desires to have a child it
would be negligent of them not to seek medical advice. The foresee-
ability of harm to the potential child would undoubtedly be pres-
ent.158 Moreover, the burden of seeking professional advice is
outweighed by the potential gravity of harm inflicted on the
child.159 Under these conditions, prospective parents have not met
their duty of care to their future child.
Now consider the situation where a father's sperm is knowingly
diseased. The father and mother engage in sexual intercourse, caus-
ing conception. As a result of the parents' conduct, this new sepa-
rate entity160 is "infected" with the disease at conception.1 61 If this
infant was born defective due to the infection of the father's sperm
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 282 comment g (1965).
152. Id.
153. W. KEETON, supra note 96, at 170.
154. Id. at 171.
155. Flemming, supra note 97, at 801.
156. Id.
157. Robertson, supra note 123, at 1439; see also supra notes 91-92 and accompany-
ing text.
158. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text for discussion of foreseeability.
159. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text for discussion of burden.
160. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
161. See Pace, Givil Liability for Pre-natal Injuries, 40 MOD. L. REv. 141, 153
(1977) (considering the validity of proposed legislation of the English Law
Commission).
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at conception, should this child be denied a recovery? There was an
injury, 162 and there was a negligent act that caused the injury. Was
there a duty on the part of the parents toward the disabled infant?
As one commentator has noted:
[I]f a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body,. . . there is a correlative duty on its parents. . . to avoid
producing conception where the circumstances are likely to re-
sult in the birth of a disabled child. In other words, the remedy
is sought not for being born, but "for compensation for the disa-
bility resulting from the sexual intercouse."' 163
The infant plaintiff, in asserting that his parents breached a duty
owed to him, would argue that his disability was a foreseeable risk
of the parents' negligent conduct, specifically, their negligent inter-
course. This conduct, it would be argued, was unreasonable, for
duty can be measured by the scope of the risk which an individual's
conduct "foreseeably entails."' 164 The parents' conduct would be
negligent because it contemplates an undue threat of harm from a
specific kind of risk.165 Thus, a duty to a child prior to conception
is breached if intercourse resulting in conception caused injury to
the newborn infant.
Finally, consider the situation where a middle-aged couple desire
a child, but are told by a medical professional that they risk con-
ceiving a child with Down's syndrome.166 Can they be said to have
acted reasonably when they proceed to conceive a child who is born
with this disease? Is the parents' conduct reasonable in conceiving
when the geneticist tells them they are in a very high risk group for
transmitting sickle cell anemia or Tay-Sachs disease?167 It would be
difficult to argue that the parents in the above situations acted rea-
162. The injury occurred at conception. The infection of the father's diseased sperm
at conception caused the injury to the new separate entity. See supra notes 116-21 and
accompanying text.
163. Pace, supra note 161, at 153. This possibility as a basis of parental liability
assumes that the parents, or at least the father, was aware of his diseased sperm. But see
supra note 151, where California Civil Code section 43.6 could be argued to bar such a
cause of action against parents. This argument is without merit because the remedy is
not sought for being born, "but 'for compensation for the disability resulting from the
sexual intercourse.'" Pace, supra note 161, at 153.
164. Flemming, supra note 97, at 781.
165. Id. at 784.
166. See Robinson, supra note 112, at 489. "[V]omen over 35. . . have a 1 1/2%
risk of having a baby with an abnormal chromosome constitution, of which Down's
syndrome (mongolism) is one of the principal and most distressing conditions. The
10% of pregnant women who are 35 years of age or older are responsible for the birth of
50% of the children with Down's syndrome." Id.
Approximately 7000 of these children are born per year in the United States, the
majority ending their lives in institutions for the retarded. Id.
167. See Kushnick, supra note 114, at 624, where the author discusses high recur-
rence risks in major mutant gene disease, such as "25%, or one in four, for autosomal
recessive conditions," such as sickle cell anemia and Tay-Sachs disease.
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sonably. They were aware of the foreseeable harm to the child. The
gravity of potential harm increased, but they did not take reason-
able precautions against this harm.168
These are just some examples of how a child's cause of action
against its parents for their preconception negligence might arise,
and how parents may breach their duty to their potential child. At-
tention must now be given to limiting this new duty of care.
E. Limiting the Parental Duty of Care
1. Constitutional Considerations.-There are certain constitu-
tional safeguards afforded all citizens. Among these are rights of
privacy.169 Among the more recognized rights within the zone of
privacy, which are considered to be fundamental, are marriage,1 70
procreation,17' contraception,172 family decision making, 73 child-
rearing,' 74 and a woman's decisions relating to abortion.175 Imposi-
tion of a duty of care on prospective parents would certainly affect
an individual's exercise of these fundamental rights.
Arguments calling for a limitation on these rights would be diffi-
cult. Although parents do have a constitutional right to marry,
procreate, and make decisions regarding their family, do they have
a right to cause an injury to an innocent child? Should the parents
negligent conduct prior to conception be treated any differently
from the conduct of any other tortfeasor? An answer to these ques-
tions would require a court to balance the interests of a potential
parent's right to treat his or her body with impunity, and the right
of a child to be born with a sound mind and body.176 In Roe v.
168. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. Dean Prosser has stated that:
[I]f the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible consequences are serious,
the question is not one of mathematical probability alone. The odds may be
one thousand to one that no train will arrive at the very moment that an
automobile is crossing a railway track, but the risk of death is nevertheless
sufficiently serious to require the driver to look for the train and the train to
signal its approach.
W. KEETON, supra note 96, at 171.
169. The first United States Supreme Court case to acknowledge the right of marital
privacy as being within the "penumbra" of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, was
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
170. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
See also Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
171. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
172. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
173. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
174. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
175. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176. When a regulation affects a citizen's fundamental rights, the courts will apply
strict standards of review. For example, in his well known, concurring opinion, Justice
White stated:
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
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Wade, although the Supreme Court of the United States protected a
mother's right to decide whether or not to have children once she is
pregnant, the Court's opinion did not say whether a mother could
be negligent in carrying out her decision. 177
The Roe court took note that no constitutional right is abso-
lute.178 Thus, it is clear that one does not have an unlimited right to
treat one's body with impunity.179 However, it is very possible that
claims of parental preconception negligence might be subject to
constitutional limitations.180
2. Other Considerations.-One possible problem that needs to
be considered in recognizing a cause of action for parental precon-
ception negligence, is the fear of a flood of frivolous lawsuits com-
menced by children against their parents.' 8 ' Such fears should not
be treated any differently than other types of actions merely because
they involve child-parent suits. Courts should not refuse to con-
sider such suits to redress an injury simply because the plaintiff
might have problems in proving his case.182 Nor should a court
decline to consider such cases for the reason that to provide redress
might possibly "give rise to fraudulent claims."' 8 3 The trial courts
of this country maintain a large degree of control by adherence to
established rules of evidence and requirements of sufficient evi-
dence, to protect against the possibility of fraudulent recoveries. 84
Another consideration is the fear that recognition of such a cause
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184. But such statutes, if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a
legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or capricious in ap-
plication, are not invalid under the Due Process Clause. Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (White, J., concurring).
It is, therefore, clear that if a state regulates in the area of fundamental rights, it must
show a compelling interest for doing so. Strong arguments can be made that the state
does have a compelling interest in maintaining the quality of its citizenry.
In support of the proposition that no right is absolute and beyond state regulation, it
has been held that even though procreation is a natural and constitutionally protected
right, citizens do not have any rights which dominate over the common welfare of soci-
ety. See Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 415, 204 N.W. 140, 142 (1925).
177. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1260-61.
178. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
179. Id. at 154.
180. The author acknowledges the paramount importance of constitutional consid-
erations in imposing a duty on potential parents prior to conception. However, due to
the breadth of the subject, a truly comprehensive presentation of constitutional issues is
outside the scope of this Comment.
181. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 366, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
182. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1953) (en banc).
183. Id.
184. 31 N.J. at 366, 157 A.2d at 504 (1960); see also Steggall, 363 Mo. at 1231, 258
S.W.2d at 580.
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of action would result in the imposition of unlimited liability on
subsequent generations. 185  This fear is understandable. The
thought of a child suing its grandparents for their negligent conduct
two generations earlier seems unreasonable. 186 However, this is no
reason for a blanket denial of the proposed cause of action. As the
court in Renslow ex rel. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital187 pointed
out in considering the same question, "when such a case is
presented, the judiciary will effectively exercise its traditional role
of drawing rational distinctions, consonant with current perceptions
of justice, between harms which are compensable and those which
are not."188 Also, as will be discussed below, 189 state legislatures
can play a role in decreasing the potential of perpetual liability by
enactment of special statutes of limitation. Nevertheless, there is a
recurring fear that by allowing such a cause of action to exist, fam-
ily harmony and cohesiveness will be severely impaired.' 90 It is
possible that such an action will cause disruption within the family
unit. However, this is no reason for a blanket denial of such an
action by the child. It is reasonable to say that the advantages
gained by the child and society generally outweigh the possibility of
family discord that recognition of such a cause of action might
have.
IV. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
It is necessary to recognize the need for specific limitations on an
action by a child against its parents for preconception torts. Paren-
tal liability to a child for preconception torts should be predicated
on instances of gross negligence only.' 91 When the parents actually
had knowledge that their child would be born defective, liability
should be based on whether they acted or failed to act accordingly.
Recognizing such a limitation could be a judicial aid to sufficiently
controlling the feared onslaught of fraudulent and frivolous
claims.192 It would impose liability only where the parents, in ef-
fect, acted willfully and recklessly toward their child. It would pre-
185. Note, supra note 44, at 152.
186. The fear, in the context of allowing a child-parent suit, would be that recogni-
tion of a cause of action against a parent would set a precedent for allowing unlimited
liability on previous generations.
187. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
188. Id. at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
189. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
191. See Comment, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of a Child Against Its
Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 587 (1976) (where the author advocated holding a
mother liable to her defective child only for gross negligence resulting in prenatal
injuries).
192. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
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vent parental liability where the parents' negligence was ordinary.
Such a limitation could accurately diminish the class of potential
defendants.
A second possible limitation would be the enactment of special
statutes of limitations by the legislature to diminish the possibility
of unlimited liability on future generations. 193 For example, one
such statute might contain a requirement that an infant's suit be
brought within three years from the time of the infant's birth. Such
a time period might ensure the availability of important evidence
necessary for such a cause of action. In addition, a legislative prohi-
bition on all preconception claims of those not born within the first
generation of the negligent parents may be enacted. This would be
a solution to the feared problem of an infant bringing suit against
more remote generations. A final statutory limitation might be to
limit these types of actions to situations where the parents were
cohabitating at the time of their negligence. This would allow the
judiciary to formulate a more cognizable legal duty.
Finally, a case by case analysis should be utilized by the judiciary
in developing the parameters of this potential cause of action. Re-
sort to the common law should be made. The common law is con-
stantly evolving and changing; it must conform to ever increasing
technological, economic and social changes. 194 Judges of today pos-
sess sufficient skill, insight and resourcefulness to determine
whether or not precedents should be created or extended. 195 The
strength of our legal system lies in its ability to discover answers for
novel problems arising in many different contexts. Our legal system
must be creative. 196
CONCLUSION
The rights of the infant child have been significantly expanded.
Since the initial pronouncement by Justice Holmes that a child
could not recover for injuries received while in utero,197 courts have
slowly recognized that such a holding was inequitable. The courts
first took notice that an infant's right to be free from personal injury
begins at its viable stage.198 Courts then began to accept the notion
that the infant's right begins at an even earlier stage, at concep-
tion. 199 Finally, this trend continued so that the infant's rights were
193. See Note, supra note 185, at 152 (where a five year limit was suggested for suits
arising from the preconception negligence of physicians and hospitals).
194. Park, 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
195. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142.
196. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962).
197. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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recognized in certain circumstances to exist prior to its
conception. 200
It now appears that the courts have created a potential cause of
action by an infant against its parents for their negligence prior to
the child's conception. Such a suit, in the majority of states today,
would survive the defense of parental immunity.201 In addition,
there are numerous policy considerations and legal factors present
that would justify the courts imposition of a legal duty on prospec-
tive parents. 20 2 Under limited circumstances, and with the availa-
bility of certain judicial and legislative safeguards, a preconception
negligence cause of action against parents should be afforded an in-
jured child. Such an action is necessary to deter tortious acts "that
otherwise would be granted a type of immunity from legal sanc-
tion. ' 20 3 Recognition of this cause of action is necessary if the
rights of a fetus and child are to be fully protected.2°4
It is elementary that for every injury there should be a remedy.205
The law of negligence has its development in the common law,
"whose great virtue is its adaptability to the conditions and needs of
changing times."' 206 Thus, legal recognition of a child-parent cause
of action for preconception negligence is a necessary and proper re-
sult of society's development. The legal system should adapt
accordingly.
Douglas E. Carroll*
200. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 97-150 and accompanying text.
203. Note, supra note 35, at 1260-61.
204. Id.
205. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 123.
206. 31 N.J. at 362, 157 A.2d at 501.
* The author would like to thank his parents, Gary and Diane Carroll, for their
continued support throughout this venture.
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